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The progress of philosophy, at least, is dialectical: we return to old insights in new and, we hope, 





Our epistemic position with respect to other persons has almost surely not been used 
to reject the immateriality of human nature until around the middle of the twentieth 
century.2 Gilbert Ryle was one of the first recent philosophers to turn the difficulty 
 
1 P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London: Routledge, 2008). 
2 I have searched in vain for such cases before the 20th century, though it’s hard to prove negative 
existentials in the history of philosophy. I should add, however, that this is not the case for the 
“problem of other minds” per se (i.e. not as a challenge to substance dualism or to the immateriality 
of the soul). It has historical roots in ancient philosophy (e.g. the Cyrenaics and the neo-Pyrrhonist 
Theodosius) and there are various discussions about the issue in the modern era of philosophy (e.g. 
Thomas Reid and John Stuart Mill). See Voula Tsouna, “Remarks about Other Minds in Greek 
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of accounting for our knowledge of other people’s minds (that is normally called the 
problem of other minds) into an explicit argument against their immateriality.  In his 
book The Concept of Mind Ryle asserts that an adherent of the official theory (i.e.,  
Cartesian substance dualism) “has no good reason to believe that there do exist 
minds other than his own.” 3  Since then the problem of other minds has been 
systematically exploited as one of the standard challenges to mind-body (brain) 
substance dualism. William Jaworski, for example, has formulated the challenge in 
the following way: 
1 If substance dualism is true, then we cannot know what mental states other people have or that 
other people exist. 
2 We can know what mental states other people have and that other people exist. 
Therefore, substance dualism is false.4 
 
Philosophy,” Phronesis, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Aug., 1998), pp. 245-263; and Anita Avramides, Other 
Minds (London: Routledge, 2001).  
3 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 15.  
4  William Jaworski, Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011), p. 50. See also Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1996), P. 26; Georges Rey, Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical 
Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 74; and Dean Zimmerman, “Dualism in the Philosophy 
of Mind,” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd edition) volume 3, ed. in chief Donald M. Borchert 
(Farmington Hills, MI: Thomson Gale, 2006), pp. 113-122, at p.118.  
